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ABSTRACT
A Schmittian idea underpins democratic constitutions: when chaos threatens order, the 
democratic constitutions allow the suspension of the law for its preservation. That is, con-
stitutions envisage the possibility of suspending the rights of some individuals in order to 
safeguard the normal life ―whatever may be understood by «normality»― of the State. 
The aim of this paper is to examine what, in our opinion, constitutes a recent example of 
such a phenomenon in contemporary Spain: the illegal strike carried out by the Spanish 
air traffic controllers in December 2010 and the state of alarm that the Spanish govern-
ment declared as a response to it. In our opinion, this case illustrates the complex ways in 
which the law is at work even when it seems it is not. By exploring this phenomenon we 
will also show three of the collateral effects of democracy. 
Keywords: Giorgio Agamben, Jacques Derrida, state of alarm, state of exception, strike of 
Spanish air traffic controllers. 
RESUM
Les constitucions democràtiques descansen sobre una idea característica de Carl Schmitt: 
quan l’ordre es troba amenaçat pel caos, les constitucions democràtiques permeten que se 
suspengui la llei per tal que la constitució i l’ordre siguin preservats. És a dir, les consti-
tucions inclouen la possibilitat de suspendre els drets d’alguns individus per tal de salva-
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guardar la vida normal ―sigui el que sigui el que s’entengui per «normalitat»―de l’Estat. 
L’objectiu d’aquest article és examinar el que ens sembla que constitueix un exemple re-
cent d’aquest fenomen dins de l’Estat espanyol: la vaga il·legal que dugueren a terme els 
controladors aeris el desembre del 2010 i l’estat d’alarma que, com a reacció, va declarar 
el govern espanyol. Proposem que aquest cas il·lustra la complexitat de la manera com la 
llei segueix vigent fins i tot quan ha estat posada en suspensió. En explorar aquest feno-
men, també mostrarem tres dels efectes col·laterals de la democràcia.
Paraules clau: Giorgio Agamben, Jacques Derrida, estat d’excepció, vaga dels controla-
dors aeris espanyols.
Introduction
A clearly Schmittian idea underpins democratic constitutions: when chaos 
threatens order, the democratic constitutions allow the suspension of the law 
for its preservation. That is, constitutions envisage the possibility of a state of 
exception: suspending the rights of some individuals in order to safeguard the 
normal life ―whatever may be understood by «normality»― of the State. In 
other words, a seemingly fair end justifies a questionable means, but a means 
that is absolutely legal, which is to say that belongs to the juridical order. For 
Schmitt, the possibility of suspending the laws is a powerful and necessary 
instrument to prevent chaos from unleashing.1
This mechanism ―which, according to Carl Schmitt, is at work only 
during a state of exception― has actually become one of the foundations of 
current politics. September 11th was a crucial turning point in this regard. It 
unleashed the so-called war on terror, which rests upon the suspension of the 
rights of some particular individuals for the sake of society in general. Giorgio 
Agamben, the well-known Italian philosopher, goes so far as to claim that we 
now live in a permanent state of exception: it is impossible to distinguish be-
tween the inside and the outside of the law.2
1. See C. Schmitt, Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty 
(Massachusetts: MIT, 1985; 19221). Carl Schmitt argues that the function of the suspension of 
some laws typical of a state of exception ―that is, when a complex and threatening political, 
social or economical conjunction is at stake― is not to lead to chaos or anarchism, but by con-
trast, to get back to normality, therefore preserving the withstanding legal order. In exceptional 
states, he claims, some laws must be suspended because they prove ineffective for reestablishing 
the normal course of things. However, this suspension of the law, as long as it aims at reinforcing 
legality, is inscribed within the juridical order (p. 6-7). In Schmitt’s words, when the sovereign 
makes decisions within a state of exception, «[a]lthough he stands outside the normally valid 
legal system, he nevertheless belongs to it, for it is he who must decide whether the constitution 
needs to be suspended in its entirety» (p. 7).
2. See G. Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life (Stanford: Stanford 
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The aim of this paper is to examine what, in our opinion, constitutes a 
recent example of such phenomenon in contemporary Spain: the illegal strike 
carried out by the Spanish air traffic controllers in December 2010 and the 
state of alarm that the Spanish government declared as a reaction to it. In our 
opinion, this case illustrates the complex ways in which the law is at work even 
when it seems as though it is not.
The article is divided into three parts. Section I presents the most rele-
vant facts of the 2010 Spanish air traffic controllers’ strike as well as its most 
significant antecedents. In Section II, the following question is posed: the air 
traffic controllers tried to oppose the law, but were their efforts successful? We 
will hold that they were not, nor could they be, since in trying to oppose the 
law, they still enforced another kind of law ―they performed what Walter 
Benjamin (1921) called «mythic violence». Section III discusses the reaction 
of the Spanish government: the declaration of a state of alarm. We examine 
how the state of alarm, despite entailing the suspension of some laws and al-
lowing some extraordinary behaviors, cannot be conceived of as outside of the 
law. Indeed, in both cases ―the strike of the air traffic controllers, on the one 
hand, and the action of the government, on the other― we will see how, de-
spite challenging current legality, all the reactions are inscribed within the 
realm of the law. The article concludes by underscoring the double-bind of this 
inescapability of the law, inherent in democracy: democracy protects citizens 
by rendering them vulnerable or, in other words, democracy protects itself 
from exterior threats by threatening its own interior.
I. The Strike and its Antecedents
It used to be said that the Spanish air traffic controllers earned what seemed a 
stratospheric salary: an average of 200,000 Euros per year.3 Furthermore, their 
working conditions were said to be exceedingly good. For instance, they were 
not allowed to work more than 1,200 hours per year, and this included desig-
nated periods of rest ―during the day, they had to rest 33 % of the time; at 
University Press, 1998; 19951). In Homo Sacer (1995), Giorgio Agamben examines a figure of 
the Roman Law —homo sacer—, who is simultaneously included by and excluded from the law 
because of the crimes he has committed. According to Agamben, such territory of indistinction 
between the inside and the outside of the law is not an anomaly of the past or of very excep-
tional situation ―Auschwitz, to cite one instance. It instead constitutes a paradigm of the politi-
cal space in Western politics. He labels it «a threshold of indistinction» (p. 18). Agamben further 
elaborates on this concept in the second chapter of State of Exception (2003), where he defines it 
as force-of-law, a notion that our paper deals with in section III. See G. Agamben, State of Excep-
tion (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005; 20031).
3. See note 5.
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night, 50 %.4 Nevertheless, their productivity was the lowest in Europe, while 
their salary was the highest.5
By April 14th, 2010, the government issued a law6 changing their condi-
tions and decreasing their salary. This brought about an ongoing confrontation 
between the controllers and the administration or AENA.7 The controllers 
hold that the new conditions were unbearable and they resorted, in vain, to all 
possible legal sources to avoid their implementation.
On November 28th, 2010, ten out of twenty-eight air traffic controllers 
from the Santiago de Compostela airport did not go to work arguing that they 
had already worked all the hours they are allowed to work within a year and 
they even pressed charges against AENA. As a result, the aerial space of San-
tiago de Compostela had to be closed. The action of these controllers encour-
aged a great deal of controllers from all over Spain, who threatened to do the 
same.
By December 3rd, a decree was issued by the cabinet meeting, according 
to which the controllers were supposed to work 1,750 hours, excluding, for 
instance, union leaves of absence, certain sick leaves, lactation leaves, exams 
leaves and absence for family bereavement.8 In response, about 80 % of the 
controllers stopped working. Thousands of flights were cancelled and the air-
ports were collapsed. Finally, the Spanish aerial space was closed.
December 3rd was no ordinary day: because of a national holiday, it was 
the first day of a period of holidays that finished the 8th. During these holidays, 
hundreds of thousands of passengers ―the government spoke of 600,000-
700,000 people― were supposed to fly to and from Spanish airports. Financial 
4. Furthermore, the air traffic and its management depended on the controllers. It was not 
until a specific law was issued on February 5th that it started relying on AENA.
5. Giovanni Bisignani (2010), General Director of International Air Transport Associa-
tion (IATA) stated: «Spanish air traffic control is the biggest cost problem for European ATM. 
Spain’s air traffic controllers are the least productive but the best paid amongst their European 
colleagues. Spanish air traffic controllers in 2010 earn an average salary of EUR 200,000 per year 
—50 % more than the European average. But their productivity is only a third of what UK con-
trollers achieve. The room for improvement is huge!» See G. Bisignani, «Un lío europeo de 5.000 
millones», El País (December 9th, 2010). Available from: http://elpais.com/diario/2010/12/09/
espana/1291849208_850215.html.
6. See Law 9/2010, April 14th, by way of which the aerial transit service supply is regu-
lated, the obligations of the civil suppliers of mentioned services are established, and specific 
working conditions concerning the civil air traffic controllers are determined.
7. AENA stands for Aeropuertos Españoles y Navegación Aérea, and is the company re-
sponsible for Spanish airports and air traffic. While it was state-owned at the time, a private 
company named «AENA aeropuertos» was created in 2011 to manage the public airports. See 
Royal Decree-Law 13/2010, December 3rd, of liberalizing interventions in the fiscal and labor 
field to promote investment and employment creation .
8. See again Royal Decree-Law 13/2010.
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losses are estimated to be in the millions. It was a big crash for the Spanish 
economy, already extremely damaged and weak due to its enduring crisis.
The controllers were ordered to return to their jobs, but they refused. The 
following day, an extraordinary cabinet meeting agreed to declare a state of 
alarm.9 This meant that the controllers were under direct control of the head 
of the Air Staff from that moment on. Should they fail to obey these orders, 
they would be judged according to military code, in which infractions of the 
law are judged more severely. For instance, not showing up for work might be 
penalized with eight years of prison. In short, the controllers and the aerial 
space were militarized.
The controllers returned to their jobs and after a few hours traffic had 
gone back to normal, leaving huge economic losses and open proceedings 
against one out of five of the controllers.
II. Strikers Against the Law within the Law
This affair puts a wide range of issues on the table. We will only deal with two 
of them: the first one entails the action of the controllers; the second one has 
to do with the reaction of the government, namely, the declaration of a state of 
alarm. In both of them, we will see the complex inner workings of the law and 
the impossibility of escaping it.
When it comes to the action of the controllers, one of the main problems 
is its legitimacy. Without a doubt, their action was not legal, since they did not 
apply for a permission to go on strike ―hence the appellative «undercover 
strike». Nevertheless, it is well-known that according to many theorists legal-
ity does not exhaust justice, that is to say, some actions may not be legal, but 
they may be just. Was this the case for the controllers?
On the one hand, a relevant sector of public opinion said that they were 
irresponsible and showed a lack of professionalism:10 they, a privileged and 
wealthy caste, collapsed the country, damaging the economy and preventing 
the humble classes from traveling for the holidays, because they wanted to 
earn even more money. The government criticism focused more on an act of 
«disobedience» that provoked a «crisis».11 On the other hand, in their favor, it 
9. Which had not been declared since the 1978 Constitution had been implemented. See 
Royal Decree 1673/2010, December 4th, by way of which a state of alarm is declared, for the 
normalization of air traffic, an essential public service .
10. See for instance J.M. González-Posada, «La huelga de los controladores aéreos», El 
País (December 7th, 2010).
11. José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero (2010), the Spanish President at the time, stated: «We 
are not dealing with a labor conflict, but with disobedience. Nobody, neither individually nor 
collectively, can take the totality of citizens as a hostage of their claims. The government will not 
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has to be said that they did not strike for an even better salary, but simply asked 
for just working conditions, that is, to be allowed the same leaves the rest of the 
workers are allowed to have and of the amount of working hours established in 
their contracts.12 Moreover, they had already pursued all other possible legal 
means. To fight for fair working conditions can be illegal, but not unjust. 
Those, though few, who defended the action of the controllers, maintained that 
having a high income is not a crime and does not automatically denote a mor-
al duty and responsibility to the citizens’ economy and holidays that exceeds 
that of the rest of the workers. Therefore, their labour rights can be defended 
by the same means as other professionals.
It is not our purpose, though, to examine whether the action of the con-
trollers was fair or not. What concerns us is that no matter if it was fair or not, 
and regardless of the above mentioned reactions against the controllers, they 
performed an illegal strike they deemed just.
The debate about the legitimacy or not of using illegal means to reach 
supposedly higher ends is certainly very old and ramified. Within contempo-
rary Western politics, it acquires a relevant dimension in the 1920s through a 
debate between the conservatism of Carl Schmitt and the libertarian ideas of 
Walter Benjamin. Such debate is also articulated within the thought of some 
Jewish philosophers who turn to certain categories belonging to the messianic 
tradition when forging their own understanding of politics and ethics.13 While 
some of them —and Benjamin himself— hold that the law is an obstacle and 
thus should be thrown away, others, such as Franz Rosenzweig (1921),14 Em-
hesitate to use, without ignoring while respecting the requirements of proportionality, all the in-
struments of the juridical state to halt situations like the ones we experienced this weekend.» See 
J.L. Rodríguez Zapatero, Recorded transmission of the ordinary session of December 9th, 2010, 
in which the Government informs las Cortes about the Royal Decree 1673/2010 issued on De-
cember 4th, by way of which the state of alarm is declared, for the normalization of air traffic, an 
essential public service. 
12. See for example, by E. Orgaz, «Adiós para siempre», December 8th, 2010, in http://
www.controladoresaereos.org/2010/12/08/adios-para-siempre.
13. Their reliance on categories belonging to the messianic tradition must be understood 
as an attempt to counteract the modern rationality to which, at that moment, many assimilated 
bourgeois Jews were adhering to, following a libertarian utopia rooted in the Jewish tradition. 
This is why their actions have been defined as simultaneously «conservative and revolutionary». 
See R. Forster, El exilio de la palabra (Buenos Aires: EUDEBA, 1999).
14. According to Rosenzweig, the mythic order can be overcome by repairing the frag-
mented totality. On this point, Rosenzweig distances himself from Hegel, as he holds that total-
ity cannot be achieved through the Hegelian dialectical process, but by hosting divine love and 
returning it to those around. But how can this love, that comes from another world and is infinite, 
be hosted in this finite world? The impact of such force is extremely dangerous, since it can an-
nihilate this world. Rosenzweig puts particular emphasis on the idea that, in order to surpass the 
mythic order, this world is not to be destroyed in its totality, but will instead be redeemed. There 
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manuel Lévinas (1968; 1974)15 and Gershom Scholem (1971),16 hold that it is a 
powerful means for liberation and redemption.
Without a doubt, the terms and contexts of the Schmitt-Benjamin contro-
versy and the debate concerning the divergent approaches to the political value 
of the messianic tradition differ significantly from the current context. How-
ever, Giorgio Agamben effectively recasts some of their key concepts in order 
to think about the current political scenario, and we believe that as long as the 
case we are dealing with belongs to the sort of phenomena Agamben focuses 
on, they can be useful in helping us to shed light on it.
At first glance it may seem that the violence inherent to this strike con-
stitutes what Walter Benjamin referred to as «divine violence». In «Critique of 
Violence» (1921),17 Benjamin sustains that justice cannot be reached through 
law. According to him, just ends are thoroughly irreconcilable with means le-
gally justified or, in other words, within the realm of law there is no room for 
justice. To clarify this point, he distinguishes between two kinds of violence: 
mythic and divine. While the first one creates, posits and preserves the law, the 
divine one destroys the law, eliminates the limits that law entails. This second 
one works for the sake of the living; the first one, by contrast, is designed to 
protect itself.18 The mythic violence, of Greek origin, leads to oppression and 
guilt; it is bloody and seeks the preservation of power. By contrast, divine vio- 
 
must therefore be a channel that prevents the destructive effects of this love from being spread 
everywhere. For Rosenzweig, this channel is the law. As he discusses in the third part of his vo-
luminous work, it is only through the law ―through its fulfillment― that divine love can provide 
the coveted unity. See F. Rosenzweig, The Star of Redemption (Madison: The University of 
Wisconsin Press, 2005; 19211).
15. Emmanuel Lévinas further developed this point, particularly in Otherwise than Being 
or Beyond Essence (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991; 19741) and in Four Talmudic 
Readings (see Quatre lectures talmudiques [Paris: Minuit, 1968]). According to Lévinas, moral 
law, the Talmud, is the tool that should help human beings to escape from the oppression of an-
other law, namely the natural law. This is the central point that Lévinas takes from Rosenzweig: 
for the thinker of Lithuanian origin, the only way beings can oppose the law of Being is to adhere 
to the Talmudic law. Talmudic law is therefore to be regarded as an antinomic strategy that actu-
ally serves the law. A. Bielik-Robson, «Tarrying with the Apocalypse: the Wary Messianism of 
Rosenzweig and Lévinas», Journal for Cultural Research, vol. 13 (2009), p. 258.
16. According to Scholem (1971), law is to be understood as a lightning rod that channels 
divine love. Humanity can only be redeemed by divine love, and yet divine love, in turn, as the 
very powerful ray that it is, can destroy everything it touches in less than a second. This annihilat-
ing force therefore has to be channeled, and the law precisely constitutes this channel. See 
G. Scholem, The Messianic Idea in Judaism and other Essays on Jewish Spirituality (New York: 
Schocken Books, 1971).
17. W. Benjamin, «Critique of Violence», Selected Writings, Vol . 1:1913-1926 (Londres: 
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1999; 19211).
18. Ibid., p. 297.
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lence, of Jewish origin, is emancipatory and culminates in freedom and jus-
tice. Life no longer needs to be regulated by laws.
It seems that the violence inherent to the air traffic controllers strike, as 
long as they opposed the law, was divine in the Benjaminian sense. However, 
appearances to the contrary notwithstanding, it should be considered mythic, 
because it did not really escape law. This point can be seen more clearly if we 
see the two kinds of strike that within the same text Benjamin associates, re-
spectively, with the mythic and the divine violence.
On the one hand, Benjamin places the general political strike, which op-
poses a certain order of things, but not the state and the law as a whole. It does 
not seek the abolition of power, but it just wants power to switch from the 
hands of some privileged individuals to the hands of other individual who will 
become equally-privileged people. On the other hand, there is the general pro-
letarian strike, which aims, in its anarchist vocation, at destroying the state 
and the law. According to Benjamin, the first kind of strike is oppressive, be-
cause, ultimately, the structure of the law is preserved, while this second one 
is emancipatory, as it entails the release from the power. In the general politi-
cal strike, there is at work a mythic violence; in the proletarian one, on the 
contrary, a divine one. This digression is clearly connected to the thesis Carl 
Schmitt holds in Political Theology I (1922) concercing the state of exception,19 
although the function Benjamin and Schmitt grant to the state of exception 
could not be further apart. Schmitt regards the states of exception as means to 
go back to normality, that is, to the mythic order. And he considers that if such 
states allow for something new, that is, if they imply a way out of the estab-
lished order, they are a failure.20 Benjamin, unlike Schmitt, claims that exiting 
the mythic law is precisely a success ―and that this should be the function of 
any strike. And ―could be added―, by extension, of any state of exception.
The air traffic controllers strike seems, then, mythic through and through 
in the Benjaminian sense: they did not intend to overthrow the law as a whole 
and reach a state of freedom in which laws were no longer needed and could 
be thrown away, but just a certain law. In spite of using a (slightly) illegal 
 
19. C. Schmitt, Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty, op . cit.
20. Agamben has attempted to demonstrate that Schmitt’s Political Theology I (1922) is a 
reaction to Benjamin’s «Critique of Violence» (1921). Agamben holds that Benjamin’s eighth 
thesis (1940) on the philosophy of history, which states that exception has become the rule, must 
be considered an answer to Political Theology I. According to Agamben (2003), Benjamin’s 
eighth thesis invalidates the role that the exception covers in Schmitt’s reading. In his thesis, 
Benjamin warns that, once the exception has become the rule, the state machine no longer works 
and must be rejected. See the rigorous argumentation that Agamben provides in order to prove 
his thesis in G. Agamben, State of Exception, op . cit., p. 52-57.
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means ―a strike without permission― their action was deeply legal, for it 
played the rules of the mythic, legal order.
Even if they had attempted to escape law, could have they managed? Is 
there any space beyond law? Is it possible to escape from it? Could there pos-
sibly be an outside of the law? How would it look like? Can law be deactivated?21 
In short, is divine violence, in the Benjaminian sense, ever possible?
We hold this case illustrates it is not: even if they had tried, the structure 
of the law would not have permitted them to move beyond it. The legal frame 
would remain unaltered. All of the movements they could have carried out would 
still belong to a sphere inhabited by the law. To see this point, let’s move on to 
the second issue that this case puts on the table, that is, the reaction of the 
Spanish government —namely, the declaration of a state of alarm.
III. The Double-bind of the State of Alarm
The Spanish Constitution envisages the possibility of three exceptional states, 
that is, three states in which certain laws and rights can be suspended for the 
preservation of the State: the state of alarm, the state of exception, and the state 
of siege. All three are regulated by the Organic Law 4/1981,22 which makes it 
clear there is a progression between them: the severity of the situation in which 
the third one is declared and the kind of measures it allows for are much more 
extreme and radical than in the second one, and far more than in the first one.
21. This is what Giorgio Agamben puts forward in several of his works, particularly in 
State of Exception (op . cit., 2003), The Time that Remains (The Time that Remains: A Comment 
on the Letter to the Romans [Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005; 20001]), «The Idea of 
Language» (Potentialities: Collected Essays in Philosophy [Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
2005; 19991], p. 39-47) and «The Messiah and the Sovereign: The Problem of Law in Walter 
Benjamin» (op . cit., p. 160-174). Agamben’s texts often explicitly and heavily rely on Benja-
min’s work. Through a rigorous examination of some of his texts, and to an important extent an 
undeniable adherence to his political thesis, Agamben proposes an alternative model. Real poli-
tics, he claims, is not what takes place inside the juridical order, but occurs precisely when the 
law has been deactivated or profanated. The way of living that he proposes entails an abolition of 
all juridical property, as he claims that it is necessary to change our idea of the political. How-
ever, Agamben’s position has met the strong opposition of scholars who argue that in his work it 
is unclear how the mythic state should be left behind to give way to the higher one Agamben 
refers to. How this change must be operated remains unclear. Siding with this position there is 
also who claims that the ideal state Agamben longs for —characterized by an absolute lack of 
difference— and can only be described as death. See, for instance, Johnson (D.E. Johnson, «As 
If the Time Were Now: Deconstructing Agamben», South Atlantic Quarterly, vol. 106, no. 2 
[2007], p. 265-290) and Bielik-Robson (A. Bielik-Robson, «A Broken Constellation: Agamben’s 
Theology between Tragedy and Messianism», Telos: Religion and the Critique of Modernity, 
no. 152 [2010], p. 103-126).
22. See Organic Law 4/1981 on the state of alarm, exception and siege .
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According to this law (chapter II, article IV), a state of alarm can be de-
clared in four situations:
a) Catastrophes, public calamities or misfortunes, such as earthquakes, 
floods, urban and forest fires or major accidents.
b) Health crises such as epidemics, and severe pollution situations.
c) Stoppage of essential public services to the community, when what is 
stipulated in Articles 28.2 and 37.2 of the Constitution is not guaran-
teed, and in the event of some of the other circumstances or situations 
contained in this article.
d) Situations of shortage of staples.
According to the decree of December 4th (Decree 1673/2010),23 through 
which the state of alarm was declared for the first time since Spain imple-
mented the current constitution (1978), the illegal strike of the air traffic con-
trollers had unleashed situation c. As mentioned above, this situation is not 
sufficient to declare such an exceptional state, but still requires, at least, an-
other one. The decree stated that situations a and d were also given at that 
moment. Consequently, the air traffic controllers were militarized, as it was 
considered the only way to recover normality.
This mechanism is certainly frightening. Normally, one knows he or she 
is protected by the law. Well, perhaps one is not exactly protected by it, but 
one is aware of the fact that if he follows it, nothing can happen to him and it 
cannot harm him. And this fact protects him. Law limits one’s freedom, it is 
true, but also delimits a safe area. By contrast, in an exceptional state, one feels 
lost. At any moment, if the situation is considered catastrophic enough ―and 
this is, ultimately, a subjective decision― the state can turn against him. The 
perverse point of this phenomenon is that the law is suspended, but is not abol-
ished, because its force is still at work. Almost paradoxically, the state of ex-
ception inscribes itself, thus, within the juridical order.24
Giorgio Agamben (1999)25 sheds light on this phenomenon turning to a 
letter that Gershom Scholem, the well-known scholar of religion, wrote to 
23. See Royal Decree 1673/2010, December 4th, by way of which a state of alarm is de-
clared, for the normalization of air traffic, an essential public service .
24. According to Schmitt, since the exception «is different from anarchy and chaos, order 
in the juristic sense still prevails even if it is not of the ordinary kind» (op . cit., p. 12). This is the 
case because the law is suspended for the preservation of power; it is a provisional measure that 
does not seek the abrogation of the law, but rather its strengthening in the long term. In Schmitt’s 
words «the state suspends the law in the exception on the basis of its right of self-preservation» 
(p. 12).
25. See G. Agamben, «The Idea of Language», op . cit.
15723_Convivium 27/28_2.indd   136 16/05/17   10:00
137A Reading of the 2010 Declaration of a State of Alarm in Spain
Walter Benjamin in 1934.26 In it, Scholem describes the status of the law in 
Kafka’s work as a Geltung ohne Bedeutung, a force without significance, 
which Agamben expresses as force-of-law. There is no longer any law at work, 
but the force of law remains. Agamben quotes Scholem’s letter: «a stage in 
which revelation does not signify [bedeutet], yet still affirms itself by the 
fact that it is in force. Where the wealth of significance is gone and what ap-
pears, reduced, so to speak, to the zero point of its own content, still does not 
disappear.»27
This structure is analogous to the linguistic phenomenon of the «zero 
phoneme» coined by Lotz and Jakobson that Jacques Derrida analyzes.28 This 
notion refers to phonemes that do not mean anything and do not add any mean-
ing to a given word, and were they to disappear from a certain word neither the 
pronunciation of the word nor its sense would be altered. In modern Catalan 
and Spanish, the letter h is a clear example. H is a skeleton without flesh, a 
signifier that does not refer to any signified in particular. However, as Jacques 
Derrida highlighted, the phoneme zero distinguishes itself from the absence of 
phoneme.29 In this stage in which the signifier is reduced to its minimum ex-
pression one does not find nothingness, but rather an impulse or force that is 
not exhausted in any signified in particular. At the zero degree of meaning 
there is superabundance. And said superabundance makes the exactitude of 
sense, the precision of sense ―in short, the univocity of meaning― just im-
possible.
This same sort of force is what is at stake in the Geltung ohne Bedeutung 
Scholem is concerned with. This force is at work but does not come into force 
or does not result in any law in particular. It is a mere force of law deprived of 
any concrete shape. It cannot be grasped, known or reached. It keeps its force, 
but there is no longer any identifiable law. Therefore, one cannot be within it 
―that is, one cannot fulfill or obey it― nor can one be outside of it. In other 
words, at a state of exception there is at stake a threshold of indistinction be-
tween the inside and the outside of the law.
What concerns us here is that this force disconnected from any concrete 
law, instead of meaning total freedom, becomes a terrible oppression. If there 
is no regulation, one is absolutely vulnerable; we are exposed to the force of 
law. Law haunts us, but we can neither stick to it nor break it, because its shape 
 
26.  See W. Benjamin; G. Scholem (ed.), The Correspondence of Walter Benjamin and 
Gershom Scholem, 1932-1940 (New York: Schocken, 1989).
27. G. Agamben, «The Messiah and the Sovereign: The Problem of Law in Walter Benja-
min», op . cit.
28. See J. Derrida, L’écriture et la différence (París: Seuil, 1979).
29. Ibid., p. 425.
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has vanished. One need only think of Auschwitz Concentration Camp or 
Guantánamo Bay Detention Camp.
It cannot be denied that this suspension of the law is designed to protect 
citizens in dangerous situations, but it is done through ambiguous means: ren-
dering some citizens extremely vulnerable. For example: the declaration of a 
state of alarm, states article 11, allows for:
— Limiting the circulation of people and vehicles in certain times and 
places.
— Practicing temporary requisitions of all kind of goods and impose per-
sonal obligatory services.
— The transitory intervention and occupation of industries, factories, 
workshops, or establishments of any sort, except private residences, 
reporting it to the concerned Ministries.
— Necessary orders to guarantee the supply of the markets and the smooth 
running of services and centers of production affected by the section D 
of the fourth article.
Yet what we would like to highlight is that citizens are not only vulner-
able during the explicitly declared states of exception, but always. This stems 
from the fact that the Constitution can be suspended at any moment (a), and its 
effects (b) as well as its duration (c) cannot be anticipated. In theory, this is not 
true, because the circumstances in which a state of alarm can be declared are 
clearly defined, as are its effects and its duration. However, a careful reading 
of this law brings to light that the decision of whether a situation is critical 
enough is ultimately subjective (a), as are the implications that a state of alarm 
has for the citizens (b) as well as its length (c).
Let’s focus on the three mentioned facts one by one.
a) How is it decided whether a situation is critical enough? The following 
conclusion is drawn from the reading of said law: none of the four fac-
tors that can induce a state of alarm is clear-cut. When it comes to the 
first factor, how does one define what «catastrophes, public calamities 
or misfortunes» are? How are limits set between a «major accident» 
and an accident that does not warrant the declaration of a state of 
alarm?
Regarding the second factor that can induce a state of alarm, what 
is understood by «severe» pollution? Who sets the limit between what is 
severe and what is not? How can it be guaranteed that the politicians 
who declare the state of alarm are not saying the situation is «severe» 
because they have some personal, economic or political interests in the 
declaration of such a state? It has been claimed that the declaration of 
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the state of alarm was a strategy on the part of the Spanish government 
to divert the attention of the citizens away from some unpopular mea-
sures recently taken, and to reinforce its image. Actually, the popular-
ity of the Spanish government increased drastically after militarising 
aerial space.
Yet even if this was not the case and the politicians had good 
intentions, how can we be sure that, without meaning to, they are not 
misusing the adjective «severe»; that they are not abusing it? And, fi-
nally, turning to the last of the situations, d, how can it be established 
what a basic product or staple is? Is it true that, as a result of the air 
traffic controllers’ strike, there was a shortage of some basic products? 
It depends, of course, on where the threshold lies between what is ba-
sic and what is not.
b) The implications of a state of alarm for citizens are not, actually, regu-
lated, but depend on subjective criterion. As article 9 reads, «civil au-
thorities of public administration of the territory affected by the dec-
laration, as well as its workers, will be under the direct orders of the 
proper authority as far as it is necessary for the protection of people, 
goods and places».
c) We would like to underline a third instance of subjectivity in the law 
that regulates the state of alarm, this time concerning its duration. Ac-
cording to article 6, 2, a state of alarm cannot exceed fifteen days, al-
though «it can be extended by an authorization of the Chamber of 
deputies». This means that, in reality, the length of the state is not 
regulated.
In summary, the close reading of this law reveals that, among the seem-
ingly objective vocabulary of the juridical sphere, there are plenty of words 
that are not objective at all. Consequently, in the end there is no static regula-
tion. But this, while it avoids the oppression of a rigid, invariable law, provokes 
another kind of oppression, derived from the fact that a state of alarm can be 
declared at any moment. Even when we think we are governed by some con-
crete laws, we are not. In democracy, we are exposed to the overarching force-
of-law at all times.
This can only mean something that Carl Schmitt already noticed: de-
mocracy and dictatorship belong to the same family.30 Agamben, in Homo 
30. It is true that in 1921, in a text entitled On Dictatorship (C. Schmitt, La dictadura: 
Desde los comienzos del pensamiento moderno de la soberanía hasta la lucha de clases proleta-
ria [Madrid: Alianza, 2003; 19211], forthcoming in English, by Polity Press, Cambridge), 
Schmitt had already dealt with the issue of the state of exception, but only in its relation to dicta-
torships. It was not until 1922’s Political Theology that he examined the link between the state of 
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Sacer31 (1995) and in State of Exception32 (2003), picked up this thread again 
and brought it to a more radical conclusion, following Benjamin’s eighth thesis 
of history:33 the exception has become the rule; we live in a permanent state of 
exception. It is obvious that a dictator can do whatever he pleases, while, in 
democracy, thousands of laws regulate the action of the government. However, 
and this is the startling similarity between a democracy and a dictatorship, 
almost all of these laws can be suspended (although not by a person, but by a 
group of people). It is true that these people are the citizens’ representatives, 
but citizens delegate their power to them, so their decisions do not necessarily 
coincide with their. From this perspective, all democratic laws would just be a 
cushion that softens the brutality of dictatorship. The possibility of suspending 
the law, that is, the fact that democracy is not based on a rigid structure, is, 
simultaneously, the major weakness and the major strength of democracy.
Final Remarks
Finally, we would like to point out how the conclusions we have drawn from 
our examination of the case of the air traffic controllers actually constitute 
three of the collateral effects of democracy.
In the first place, this case brings forth the inescapability of the law. This 
is what we have seen when looking at the controllers’ actions ―they opposed 
a law through a legal structure― and those of the government ―it reacted to 
the controllers by essentially suspending the law, legally. We are exposed 
to the law at all times and we can only act through it. Within democracy, there 
is no outside of the law; there is no room for the divine violence Walter Benja-
min longed for ―the mythic law cannot be overcome. Absolute freedom and 
justice can thus never be reached.
The mechanics of this relation between law and justice is lucidly ex-
plored by Jacques Derrida in «Force of Law. The “Mystical Foundation of 
the exception and all exercise of power, which encompasses all forms of government, and not 
only dictatorships. As the well-known first sentence of his Political Theology reads: «sovereign 
is he who decides on the exception» (p. 5). In affirming that the legal order rests upon a decision 
and not, as is often believed, upon a norm, Schmitt shows that democracy includes some ele-
ments of dictatorships. Most democrats have preferred to ignore this, supporting a supposed 
impersonality of democracy as a guarantee that the will of the sovereign will not be imposed on 
the rest of the individuals. These democrats do not realize, however, that even within democracy 
decision is unavoidable.
31. Op . cit.
32. Op . cit.
33. See W. Benjamin, «Theses on the Philosophy of History», Illuminations (New York: 
Schocken Books, 1986; 19401), p. 253-264.
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Authority”» (1989-90).34 According to Derrida, each law rests upon a previous 
law, creating a machinery in which each piece depends on another. The whole 
apparatus seeks justice, which seems to occupy the first position of such ma-
chinery, but justice can never be attained because, according to Derrida, jus-
tice constitutes the condition of possibility of the laws, and, as the mere pos-
sibility it is and will always be, it can never be reached nor grasped. That is to 
say, justice, as a mere possibility, lacks a particular shape and therefore can 
never be achieved. It is «unpresentable».35
Yet it is undeniable ―Derrida goes on to say― that many laws try to pres-
ent themselves as the law, that is, as undeconstructable truths. In their endeav-
our to present themselves as self-evident they try to constitute themselves as 
justice. They try, in short, to usurp the space traditionally assigned to justice. 
But again this attempt is in vain since as long as justice lacks a concrete form 
laws cannot encompass it. In Benjaminian terms: the mythic order can never 
be surpassed. In short, the strike of the air traffic controllers teaches us that 
law cannot be overcome or done away with.
In contrast to Benjamin and Agamben, for Derrida this impossibility of 
reaching justice should not be regarded as a misfortune, but rather as a pre-
cious guarantee of an openness that avoids asphyxiation. But does the case 
examined in this paper show this resistance to asphyxiation? Yes and no. On 
the one hand, the way law is entangled with life makes individuals feel trapped 
in a limited space, and act within a pre-established territory from which they 
cannot escape. Yet on the other hand, as we have seen, this limitation delimits 
a fairly safe area. Moreover, the disappearance of the differences that support 
the law would generate a space much more unbearable. Reaching justice would 
imply the disappearance of the tension that creates and maintains differences. 
Distinctions would thus vanish, leading to a complete homogenization in which 
one’s difference and particularities would simply not have room. In short: only 
that violence which aspires to the abolition of all hierarchies and distinctions 
can be said to be divine, that is, to escape law. But democracy, insofar as it is 
designed to watch over differences and singularities, cannot. Differences are 
crucial for democracy. And so, as Derrida holds elsewhere,36 the messiah will 
fortunately not show up.
This leads us to our second conclusion: this permanent exposure to the 
law ―the goal of which, as we have seen, is to guarantee collective and indi-
vidual rights, and therefore is constitutive of democracy― actually makes 
34. J. Derrida, «Force of Law: The “Mystical Foundation of Authority”» / «Force de loi: 
Le “fondement mystique de l’autorité”», Cardozo Law Review, vol. 11 (1989-1990), p. 921-973.
35. Ibid., 967.
36. J. Derrida, Spectres de Marx: l’état de la dette, le travail du deuil et la nouvelle Inter-
nationale (Paris: Galilée, 1993).
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citizens vulnerable. Derrida hopes there is no messiah who will bring with him 
justice, that is, a definitive and homogeneous state, because such state would 
abolish differences and would thus be terribly oppressive. And yet the situation 
in which we live now is also that of vulnerability. And what is more: within 
democracy this vulnerability knows no end. As we have examined, when a 
state of alarm is declared, citizens are automatically rendered vulnerable. But 
while said state of alarm is not declared, the possibility of its declaration also 
threatens citizens because as we have seen the terms for its declaration are not 
clear-cut. What is supposed to protect citizens renders them vulnerable. Or, 
more precisely, democracy protects citizens by rendering them vulnerable.
Citizens are made vulnerable because democracy is threatened from out-
side. That is, the underlying motivation of the war on terror —democracy must 
be preserved from external threats and this justifies the suspension of some 
laws— is an unavoidable, collateral effect of democracy. The war on terror is, 
thus, inherent in democracy.
However, as the strike of the Spanish air traffic controllers teaches us, 
democracy is not only threatened from outside, but also, and especially, from 
within. This is our third concluding remark. As a careful reading of the Or-
ganic Law 4/1981 has revealed, democracy includes by definition some non-
democratic phenomena. It has even been argued that democracy rests upon a 
non-democratic foundation. As Derrida put forward in Rogues, it is in this 
sense that democracy might be labelled self-immune.37
As long as democracy includes non-democratic practices, the limits of 
democracy are blurred. At some point, it becomes impossible to clearly distin-
guish the inside from the outside of democracy. The state of alarm declared in 
2010 reveals that democracy includes what it tries to excludes, fights against 
what constitutes it, patrols its limits by moving beyond its limits. Democracy 
is therefore in an ongoing fight against itself, because it needs to be perpetu-
ally threatened from within in order to take the upper hand when being threat-
ened by forces longing for an outside. This is the third lesson that can be 
drawn from the examination of the case in question.
In our view, the main lesson that can be learned from the examination of 
the 2010 strike of the air traffic controllers is the result of the articulation 
of the three concluding remarks we have pointed to: democracy, in order to 
protect itself from external threats, needs to be threatened from within (con-
clusive remark 3), and this is done through the permanent possibility of declar-
ing a state of exception, in which citizens are rendered vulnerable by the sus-
37. See Derrida (2003), where he holds that there is a point in democracy which requires 
a non-democratic decision, hence the aporia it rests upon. J. Derrida, Voyous: Deux essais sur la 
raison (Paris: Galilée, 2003).
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pension of some laws (conclusive remark 2), a suspension which nevertheless 
pertains to the juridical realm (conclusive remark 1).
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